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RECENT CASES
entirety to decide whether it would be apt to cause a reasonable man to surrender unwillingly his opinion. If the determination is that no coercion was
inherent, a further ruling is called for on the deliberative processes suggested
by the trial judge. Either coerciveness or wrong directions as to deliberative
methods should warrant a new trial. 34

CONFLICT OF LAWS
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SUBSTITUTED SERVICE ON FOREIGN
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS UNDER NONRESIDENT MOTOR STATUTES
With the advent of interstate travel by automobile, legislative action
regulating the use of the highways by non-resident motorists became necessary. 1 Due to the transitory presence of the out-of-state motorist following
an accident, a resident plaintiff, in order to bring suit, was forced to transport
witnesses and evidence into the domiciliary state of the non-resident. In many
cases this either precluded recovery or, where the claim was small, made such
action impractical. Early attempts to alleviate this situation culminated in the
passage of the first modern non-resident motorist statute by Massachusetts
in 1923.2 Proceeding on the theory that by using the highways a non-resident
impliedly consents to the appointment of a state official as his agent for service of process, the Act permitted an injured party to obtain jurisdiction over
an out-of-state motorist in the courts of Massachusetts. The United States
Supreme Court, recognizing the-state interest in the enforcement of regulations
reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of those who use its highways, upheld the constitutionality of this statute in Hess v. Pawloski. With4
in a few years all of the states enacted similar legislation.
tions to mislead are immaterial and the error is prejudicial no matter how good the judge's
intentions. State v. Nelson, 181 Mo. 346, 80 S.W. 947 (1904).
34. An Indiana statute, though it has apparently not been used in the problem of
coercion, might be of some aid in solving the problem in criminal cases. "The court shall
grant a new trial to the defendant for the following causes, or any of them: . . .Fifth:
When the verdict has been found by means other than a fair expression of opinion on
the part of all the jurors." IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Repl. 1942) § 9-1903. This statute'
would certainly seem to outlaw coercive instructions and possibly ones stating erroneous
methods of deliberation.

1. For example, in 1915, the state's power to require that non-resident motorists
have a driver's license was upheld. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915). Then,
in 1916, a New Jersey law requiring that non-residents appoint a state officer as agent
for service of process, prior to use of the state highways, was upheld as a valid exercise
of the power of the state to regulate the use of its highways. Kane v. New Jersey,
242 U.S. 160 (1916).
2. GEN. LAWS oF MASS., c. 90 (1921), as amended by c. 431, § 2 (1923) (MAss.
ANN. LAWS, c. 90, §§ 3-3B (1933)).
3. 274 U.S. 352 (1927).

4. The Indiana non-resident motorist statute, IND. STAT. ANN. § 47-1043 (Burns
Supp. 1949) is typical and provides as follows: "The operation by a non-resident, or by
his duly authorized agent, of a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway of this state
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It was soox, discovered, however, that existing statutes failed to provide
relief where it was most sorely needed. The serious accident, where injury,
property damage, and the resulting public interest is greatest, is most likely
to result in the death of the non-resident motorist. As highway carnage multiplied, attempts to bring an action against the legal representative of a deceased
non-resident were unsuccessful. The courts uniformly refused to extend the
statutes to furnish a means of acquiring jurisdiction over a foreign executor
or administrator.5 Recent amendments to non-resident motorist statutes
evince legislative attempts to solve this problem."
The New York statute, as amended, provides for substituted service of
7
process upon the legal representative of a deceased non-resident motorist.

In Leighton v. Roper8 the plaintiff, a resident of New York, was injured
when the automobile in which she was a passenger collided with an automobile operated by one Allen, a resident of Indiana. The accident occurred
in New York and following Allen's death the plaintiff brought an action for
negligence in a New York court against the Indiana administrator of Allen's
estate. After service of process in accordance with the statute, defendant
administrator appeared specially and moved to vacate the service and dismiss
shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment of the Secretary of State, or his successor
in office, to be his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful processes in any action or proceeding against him, growing out of an accident or collision in
which such a non-resident may be involved while so operating or permitting to be operated a motor vehicle on any such street or highway, . . ." For compilation of statutory

citations see Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832, 836 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
5. The most common theory used is based on the agency doctrine that the death of
the non-resident motorist (principal) revokes the agency created by the statute. Buttson
v. Arnold, 4 F.R.D. 492 (D.C. Pa. 1945); Brogan v. Macklin, 126 Conn. 92, 9 A.2d 499
(1939); Harris v. Owens, 142 Ohio St. 379, 52 N.E.2d 522 (1943); Young v. Potter
Title & Trust Co., 114 N.J.L. 561, 178 Atl. 177 (1935); Dowling v. Winter, 208 N.C.
521, 181 S.E. 751 (1935).
The courts have also held that legislation of this nature is in derogation of the common law and will be strictly construed. Thus, in the absence of express statutory provision, the courts will not extend the statute to allow substituted service of process upon
executors or administrators. Rogers v. Edwards, 164 Kan. 492, 190 P.2d 857 (1948);
Riggs v. Schneider's Ex'r., 279 Ky. 361, 130 S.W.2d 816 (1939) ; Downing v. Schwenck,
"138 Neb. 395, 293 N.W. 278 (1940) ; State ex rel. Ledin, Adm'x. v. Davison, 216 Wis.
216, 256 N.W. 718 (1934).
A few courts have refused to extend these statutes on the theory that a foreign
representative is immune from suit within the state in the absence of a res of the estate
within the jurisdiction of the court. Balter v. Webner, 175 Misc. 184, 23 N.Y.S.2d 918
(1941) ; Vecchione v. Palmer, 249 App. Div. 661, 291 N.Y.S. 537 (1936).
6. Prior to 1949, six states had amended their non-resident motor statutes to include
executors and administrators of deceased non-resident motorists. ARK. STAT. § 1375
(Pope Supp. 1944); IowA ConE ANN. §§ 321.498, 321.499 (1946); MD. ANN. CODE, Art.
66y § 106 (e) (Flack Supp. 1947) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 9.2103 (Henderson Supp. 1949);
N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 52; WIS. STAT. § 85.05 (3) (1947).
In 1949, three additional states amended their statutes. NED. Acts 1949, c. 54,
S. C. AcTs 1949, No. 223, § 22; TENN. CODE ANN. § 8671 (Williams Supp. 1949).
7. N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 52.

8. 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E.2d 876 (1950).

§ 1;
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the complaint. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
lower court upholding the substituted service, and sustained the statute as a
valid exercise of the state's police power.
The validity of legislative provisions similar to those in the Roper case
has been tested in two previous cases. In 1943, the Arkansas Supreme Court
sustained a similar amendment and allowed recovery against the administrator
of a deceased resident of Ohio.' In 1947, however, a federal district court
declared an Iowa statute, permitting substituted service of process on a foreign
administrator, invalid.'" In reaching this conclusion the court blandly discussed, as admitting of no exception, the general rule that the jurisdiction of
the courts of each state is limited to the property of the decedent located
within the state." On this premise the court held that in the absence of
such property the Iowa legislature could not grant jurisdiction over foreign
executors or administrators to the Iowa courts. 2
However, legal concepts are not susceptible to application with mathematical certainty. And like all general rules this jurisdictional concept has
been excepted to in those in'stances where the state interest is sufficient to so
warrant.1 3 As the number of accidents involving out-of-state motorists increases, the state interest in overcoming those burdens which frequently
preclude recovery by its citizens becomes of primary importance. It was the
recognition of these obstacles to recovery and the concomitant state interest in
supervising the use of its highways that prompted the Supreme Court to uphold the non-resident motorist -statute in Hess v. Pawloski. By permitting an
action against the legal representative of a deceased non-resident, the recent
amendments to these statutes constitute a legislative response to this perplexing
problem. 14 Since actions against residents survive death in most states, the
fact that the deceased is a non-resident should not, without more, alter the
result.
9. The court held that the police power of the state is not limited by arbitrary rules
of agency and, therefore, the legislature could validly create an irrevocable agency binding
upon the administrator of a non-resident motorist. Oviatt v. Garretson, 205 Ark. 792,
171 S.AV.2d 287 (1943).
10. Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Iowa 1947), 15 U. OF Cm. L. REV.
451 (1948), 61 HARv. L.Rav. 355 (1948), 57 YALE L.J. 647 (1948).
11. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877) ; McMaster v. Gould, 240 N.Y. 379, 148
N.E. 556 (1925).
12. The court then reasoned that since the Iowa courts were without jurisdiction a
decision by them need not be given full faith and credit by the courts of the state where
the deceased non-resident resided. Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832, 852 (N.D. Iowa
1947).
13. An exception to the prevailing rule that foreign administrators have no standing
in courts of another state may be made as a matter of comity in the interest of justice.
Cooper v. American Airlines, 57 F. Supp. 329, 330 (S.D. N.Y. 1944); Kirkbride v. Van
Note, 275 N.Y. 244, 9 N.E.2d 852 (1937); Helme v. Buckelew, 299 N.Y. 363, 128 N.E.
216 (1920) ; See Note, 27 L.R.A. (n.s.) 101, 112 (1895).
14. See note 5 supra.
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These statutes do not constitute a naked assumption of control over matters which are in the exclusive jurisdiction of another state, for unquestionably
an appropriate action could be brought in the state where the decedent resided.
They simply overcome those burdens which obstruct recovery in the domiciliary state of the non-resident motorist. In the principal case the New York
Court of Appeals recognizes the general rule applicable to actions brought
against foreign representatives, but points out that in this narrow area the
state interest is of sufficient importance to warrent an exception. Thus, if
these statutes constitute a valid exercise of the state's police power, jurisdiction
is proper and the courts of the state of the deceased motorist should give full
faith and credit to the judgment rendered."; When considered with the trend
in analogous fields,1" it seems highly probable that the courts will accept this
extension of the non-resident motorist statutes. 17
The Indiana survival statute, which limits the permissible amount of
recovery against a decedent's estate to $1,000 and incidental expenses, presents
an additional problem."8 In deciding whether or not an action for injury or
wrongful death survives the death of the tortfeasor, the courts have held that
the survival statutes do not create an action; they merely allow an action which
15. Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947) ; Rouche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1928);
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) ; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
16. Despite the general rule that no recognition need be given a judgment entered
in a sister state against a corporation after its dissolution, the Supreme Court has held
that a Missouri judgment against an Illinois receiver was conclusive as to the nature and
amount of the claim. Morris v. Jones, supra note 15. For discussion of the analogy
between this trend and the non-resident motorist statutes, see 2 ARK. L. REv. 457 (1948);
15 U. OF CHi. L. REv. 453 (1948).
17. In view of the theories used in refusing to extend existing non-resident motorist
statutes, note 5 supra, careful consideration ought to be given to the wording when drafting an amendment to present statutes. Such an amendment might be patterned after the
New York statute which seems to effectively defeat attack both upon the theories of
strict construction and agency: "A non-resident operator or owner of a motor vehicle or
motorcycle which is involved in an accident or collision in this state shall be deemed to
have consented that the appointment of the Secretary of State as his true and lawful
attorney for the receipt of service of process pursuant to the provisions of this section
shall be irrevocable and binding upon his executor or administrator.

Where the non-

resident motorist has died prior to commencement of an action brought pursuant to this
section, setrvice of process shall be nade on the executor or administratorof such nonresident motorist in the same manner and on the same notice as is provided in the case
of a non-resident motorist. Where an action has been duly commenced under the provi-

sions of this section by service upon a defendant who dies thereafter, the court must
allow the action to be continued against his executor or administrator upon motion with
such notice as the court deems proper." N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 52.
18. IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-403 (Burns Repl. 1946). This statute permits an action to
survive the death of either party, but limits the amount of recovery for injury or wrong-

ful death as follows: ". . . In any action for personal injuries or wrongful death surviving because of this section, the damages, if any recovered, shall not exceed the reasonable medical, hospital or funeral expenses incurred, and a sum not to exceed one
thousand dollars for any and all other loss, if sustained." Only one other state limits
the amount of recovery under its survival statute. ORE. Comp. LAWs ANN. § 8-904
(1940).
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has accrued to survive.' As a result, survival statutes have been considered as
part of the substantive law and whether a claim for damages survives the
death of the tortfeasor is determined by the law of the place of the wrong.2"
In view of this, the basic problem is to determine what effect the New
York court should give to the Indiana survival statute"- when determining the
measure of damages in an action which accrued in New York. Is the law of
the place of the wrong applicable, or must the court restrict recovery in
conformance with the law of the state in which the decedent's estate is located?
In determining this issue it is necessary to look to the state interest as reflected
by the statutory purpose." The primary purpose of survival statutes is to
allow personal actions, which at common law abated upon the death of either
party, to survive. It might be argued that since Indiana has expressly limited
the amount which may be recovered against an Indiana estate, a recovery
in excess thereof would be against the public policy of Indiana even though
the action accrued in New York.23 This argument is predicated- upon the
theory that the objective of this statute is to prevent dissolution of a decedent's
estate. However, this restriction on recovery is apparently founded on nothing
more than an illogical reluctance to overcome the archaic reasoning of the
common law.24 And in view of the fact that exemption statutes may be
utilized to protect the surviving family of a decedent,"2 the state's interest
would seem to be insufficient to preclude the New York court from awarding
damages in excess of the statutory amount allowed in Indiana. 26 Thus, the
19. Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387 (1933) ; Ex parte Schrieber, 110 U.S. 76 (1884);
Herzig v. Swift & Co., 146 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1945); Chubbock v. Holloway, 182 Mihn.
225, 234 N.W. 314 (1931); Parsons v. American Trust & Banking Co., 168 Tenn. 49,
73 S.W.2d 698 (1934) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 390 (1934).
When the question arises as to what law shall govern the right of action for injury
or wrongful death, the courts in most situations have adopted the rule that the action
accrues to the injured party at the time of injury and the law of the place of wrong
determines the right of action for death or injury. Coffman v. Wood, 5 F. Supp. 906
(N.D. Ill. 1934); Wabash R. R. v. Hassett, Adm'x., 170 Ind. 370, 83 N.E. 705 (1907);
Clark v. Southern Ry., 69 Ind. App. 697, 119 N.E. 539 (1918) ; Gray v. Gray, 87 N. H.
82, 174 AtI. 508 (1934) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 391 (1934).
20. Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387 (1933) ; Ex parte Schrieber, 110 U.S. 76 (1884);
Herzig v. Swift & Co., 146 F.2d 444 (2d Cir. 1945); Chubbock v. Holloway, 182 Minn.
225, 234 N.W. 314 (1931) ; Parsons v. American Trust & Banking Co., 168 Tenn. 49, 73
S.W.2d 698 (1934); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 390 (1934).
21. See note 18 supra.
22. Industrial Comm'n. of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947) ; Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1934) ; Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286
U.S. 145 (1932) ; Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv.
173 (1933).
23. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Balgowan, S. S. Co., 161 Md. 145, 155 Ati.
334 (1931) ; Herzog v. Stern, 264 N.Y. 379, 191 N.E. 23 (1934) ; Hughes v. Fetter, 257
Wis. 35, 42 N.W.2d 452 (1950).
24. For a discussion of the historical development of the Indiana survival statute

see Stuckey v. Stanley, 97 Ind. App. 345, 181 N.E. 382 (1933).
25. Examples of such statutory provisions are the widow's rights provisions in IND.
STAT. ANN. § 6-711 (Burns Supp. 1949) and IN . STAT. ANN. § 6-1122 (Burns 1933).
26. See note 19 supra.
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general rule as to measure of damages should be followed and the law of the
27
state in which the action accrued applied.
Such a result would have the effect of permitting recovery against the
Indiana resident in the New York court, unfettered by the limitation in the
Indiana survival statute, while the statute continues to limit recovery in an
action which accrues in Indiana. Since no valid purpose exists for imposing
this limitation, 2 the Indiana legislature should remove it and permit unlimited
29
recovery against a decedent's estate.

CRIMINAL LAW
PSYCHIATRIC AID IN EVALUATING THE CREDIBILITY OF A
PROSECUTING WITNESS CHARGING RAPE
Unfortunately, in prosecutions for rape, evidence tending to corroborate
the testimony of the prosecuting witness is often lacking. Where this situation
exists, determination of guilt is dependent on the resolution of two contradictory statements, viz., the accusation of the prosecutrix, and disavowal by
the defendant. Unlike most criminal prosecutions, where additional evidence
is presented by witnesses and through physical manifestations of probability,
this not infrequent situation has only these two antithetical ingredients. And
while the individual temperament of each juror is an inescapable constituent
of our criminal system, a lack of evidence corroborating the prosecutrix
virtually erases the possibility of an objective approach in evaluating her
credibility. When the morally reprehensible nature of the crime and the
ease with which persons may be falsely accused of rape are considered, the
27. No. Pacific R. R. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190 (1894); Hupp Motor Car Co. v.
Wadsworth, 113 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1940) ; Curtiss v. Campbell, 76 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1935) ;
La Prell v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 85 F. Supp. 182 (D.Kan. 1949); Oviatt v. Garretson,
205 Ark. 792, 171 S.-W.2d 287 (1943); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120
N.E. 200 (1918); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 412 (1934).
In Oviatt v. Garretson, supra, which is the only case to date which has allowed recovery under the provisions of the newly amended non-resident motorist statutes, the
court in measuring damages followed the general conflict of laws rule in a situation
analogous to that in the principal case. Suit was brought against an Ohio administrator
on a wrongful death action which accrued in Arkansas. Although Ohio law allows only
pecuniary damages in an action for wrongful death, the court applied Arkansas law and
allowed recovery for conscious pain and suffering prior to death.
28. No evidence has been found to support the argument that the purpose of this
limitation is to protect dissolution of a decedent's estate by creditors, but even conceding
the desirability of such protection the proper means of accomplishing this is through
statutory provisions exempting a portion of the estate, rather than a limitation in the
survival statute.

29. Since adoption of the discussed amendment to the non-resident motorist statute
by other states appears likely, this situation will occur with increasing frequency in the
future.

See note 6 supra.

